Prisoner Transportation is Inherently Dangerous in Montana
Posted on October 13th, 2009 in Injury Law, Vicarious Liability | No Comments »
Paull v. Park County – 2009 MT 321
As a general rule, contractors are not liable (financially responsible) for the torts of a subcontractor. Under Montana law, there are three exceptions to this rule which include: 1) where there is a nondelegable duty based on contract; 2) where the activity is inherently or intrinsically dangerous; and 3) where the general contractor negligently exercises a reserved right of control over a subcontractor’s work. The second exception, which was at issue in this case, only applies to torts which arise from the unreasonable risks caused by engaging in that activity. The Montana Supreme Court has ruled that a contractor “is vicariously liable for injuries to others caused by a subcontractor’s failure to take precautions to reduce the unreasonable risks associated with engaging in an inherently dangerous activity.” Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 2000 MT 112, ¶ 22.
Paull argued that transporting prisoners is an inherently dangerous activity and, therefore, because Park County had hired a company to transport him, the County was liable for the torts of the transportation company. The Montana Supreme Court agreed and ruled that “a county or other governmental entity that contracts to have prisoners transported may be held vicariously liable for injuries caused by an independent contractor that provides prisoner transport services.” Paull, ¶ 22.
Likewise, Paull argued that the State of Montana, a co-defendant in the case, owed him a duty of ordinary care. The State attempted to avoid the issue by claiming that it only had a duty to prisoners in actual custody. The Montana Supreme Court disagreed, saying that “Paull was under State authority and supervision” during his trip from Florida to Montana. Paull, ¶ 36. The Court held that “the State had a duty to exercise ordinary care in returning Paull to Montana to answer its probation revocation proceeding. This does not mean that the State may not use a private contractor or other means to transport prisoners like Paull. It does not mean that the State is strictly liable for any injury that results from prisoner transportation regardless of fault. It does mean, however, that if the State chooses to transport prisoners by allowing other entities to do the work, it may be held liable for the tortious acts or omissions of its agents undertaking the transportation.” Paull, ¶ 38.
In this case, the private company Park County had hired to transport Paull from Florida went out of business and dissolved shortly after the accident which injured Paull and killed the driver of the van he was traveling in. The company was not bonded and no assets were left. If the State nor County were vicariously liable for Paull’s injuries, there would be no one to answer for the harm he had suffered.
